Peaceful transition of power is the American dream right now – Modern Diplomacy

For by wise counsel thou shall make thy war.-Proverbs, 24/6

Understanding the Present Moment

Incoming US President Joseph Biden faces both direct and indirect threats of North Korean nuclearization.[1] During the rancorous and doctrinally-incoherent Trump presidency,[2] these risks were allowed to expand uncontrollably.[3] At this stage, they are already many-sided and grave. Ignored further, they could become more steeply unmanageable or even genuinely existential.

In essence, for Biden, the basic nuclear crisis with North Korea is arguably Job One. What exactly shall be required of his new administration? Most important, the American president will need to understand that national security and war preparedness is always a theory-based matter of mind over mind. It is never merely a straightforward question of mind over matter.[4]

To begin, any now eleventh-hour elevation of US strategic thought would need to be based upon a far greater presidential appreciation of persistently-intersecting political and military complexities. These include multiple synergies that were so wittingly and irresponsibly overlooked by Donald J. Trump.[5] Though the former president believed that he had somehow solved the North Korea nuclear problem by falling in love with Kim Jung Un[6] (and, reciprocally, Kim with him), this purported love attachment was never more than a hideous parody.[7]

How could it have been considered otherwise by serious thinkers and planners?

In all synergistic intersections,[8] by definition, the whole of any particular outcome must be greater than the sum of its parts.[9] In such challenging analytic matters, US policy-making must be kept suitably distant from distracting considerations founded upon shallow wishful thinking or unsupportable extravagant hope. To recall the ancient Greek historian Thucydides summary assessment of the Peloponnesian War: Hope is by nature an expensive commodity, and those who are risking their all on one cast find out what it means only when they are already ruined.[10]

How to Begin?

What wise counsel should now be offered? How should the Biden administration best proceed on all relevant and overlapping fronts? The ancient Greeks regarded war and war-planning as a daunting challenge of mind over mind. Effectively anticipating the later writings of Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz (On War, 1832), they typically based tactical and operational policies upon a coherent body of dialectical conversations. Here, it was already understood, the primary and preeminent battlefield would have to be carefully conceptualized before the onset of any actual troop movements or engagements.

Correspondingly, any foreseeable victory in such engagements would have to follow a mind-based articulation of strategic doctrine.[11]

In all such matters, comprehensive theory is indispensable. Always, the world, like the myriad human bodies who comprise it, must be recognized as a system.[12] Among the most serious specific implications of this explanatory metaphor, any more-or-less major conventional conflict in northeast Asia could heighten the prospect of destabilizing international conflicts elsewhere, whether immediately or incrementally.

These portentous prospects could include a regional nuclear war.

There is more. Such worrisome risks could sometime be enlarged by misguided American searches for a no-longer plausible or reasonable outcome. An example of such a mistaken search would be one that is directed toward some tangible form of victory.

There is good reason for such a warning. A non-traditional observation about victory is persuasive, at least in part, because the core meanings of victory and defeat have been changing incrementally and dramatically over time. These are no longer the same meanings as those once offered by Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz classic On War (1832).

To clarify further, in most prospectively identifiable wars between nation-states, there no longer obtain any confirmable criteria of demarcation between victory and defeat. Even a so-called victory on some actual field of battle might not in any calculable way reduce palpable and significant security threats to the United States. More precisely, such grave threats, whether foreseen or unforeseen, could include various sub-state aggressions (terrorism) and/or certain widening attacks upon regional and/or non-regional US allies.

Always, the arena of world politics is a system.

In the matter at hand, once acknowledged as a distinct foreign-policy objective, any declared US search for victory over North Korea would exacerbate strategic risks without enhancing any commensurate or derivative gains. Such a declaration could create a corrosively lethal escalatory dynamic with Pyongyang, one from which Washington would no longer expect tangible military advantages. This expectedly injurious creation could take place in unanticipated increments, or instead, suddenly, as an unexpected bolt-from-the-blue enemy attack.[13]

In the foreseeable worst case, this unwitting US forfeiture of escalation dominance would signify authentically irreversible American losses, including chaotic conditions that could create (a) tens or even hundreds of thousands of prompt fatalities; and (b) still larger numbers of latent cancer deaths[14].

It follows, inter alia, that a great deal of specificity must be examined and taken into account by incoming US President Joe Bidens pertinent senior counselors. In a world where history and science could conceivably regain their proper pride of place, an American president could very usefully acknowledge that because nation-states no longer declare wars formally[15] or generally enter into legally binding war-termination agreements , the application of traditional criteria of war winning to interstate conflicts would no longer make legal sense. Plausibly, too, in the vastly complicated matters already at hand for Americas new president, ascertainable benefits might not lie in variously traditional forms of military expertise.

Not at all.

Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense

Exactly how much applicable military experience could American generals have garnered in starting, managing or ending a nuclear war? How much might the new president and his senior commanders see only what they would want to see, including perhaps a gainful prospect of military preemption.[16] Here they should have to recall the ancient but still relevant observation of Julius Caesar at Chapter 18 of Caesars Gallic War: men as a rule willingly believe what they want to believe.

In these transitional nuclear times,[17] any such selective perceptions could prove markedly injurious and irremediably mistaken. Though, at least in principle, an American president could still benefit from a preemption against an already nuclear North Korea in certain residual and extraordinary circumstances,[18] it is incontestable that any US defensive first strike[19] would have catastrophic outcomes. Regarding the myriad complexities of any still-impending two-power nuclear competition where (a) there would exist substantial asymmetries in relative military power position; but (b) the weaker (North Korean) side would still maintain a verifiable potential to inflict unacceptably damaging first-strikes or reprisals upon the stronger (American) side, abundant policy-making caution is more important than ever.

Ironically, at a time of rampant pandemic, a nuclear war any nuclear war would be a more conclusively terminal disease. The only reasonable cure, therefore, must lie in prevention.

Under Joseph Biden, the United States will need a refined posture that can account for the rationality and intentionality of enemy decision-makers in Pyongyang. The new president should approach the still-growing North Korean nuclear threat from a more conspicuously disciplined and conceptual perspective. This means, inter alia, factoring into any coherent US nuclear threat assessment (a) the expected rationality or irrationality of all principal decision-makers in Pyongyang; and (b) the foreseeable intentional or unintentional intra-crisis behaviors of these adversarial decision-makers.

Theory is a net, quotes philosopher of science Karl Popper from the German poet Novalis in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959);[20] .only those who cast, can catch. In such bewilderingly complex strategic matters, nothing can ever prove to be more practical than good theory. Always, in science, a broadly elucidating generality is the key to uncovering specific meanings. It follows that having at hand such comprehensive policy clarifications could help guide US President Joe Biden beyond any otherwise vague or uselessly impromptu appraisals.

Under no circumstances, this new president should be reminded, should such multi-sided crisis possibilities be assessed (whether implicitly or explicitly) as singular or ad hoc phenomena.

Intentional versus Unintentional Nuclear War

There is more. Going forward, capable American strategic analysts guiding the new president should enhance their pertinent nuclear investigations by carefully identifying the basic distinctions between (a) intentional or deliberate nuclear war, and (b) unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war. The derivative risks resulting from these at least four different types of possible nuclear conflict are apt to vary considerably. Accordingly, those American analysts who might remain too completely focused upon a deliberate nuclear war scenario could too-casually underestimate a more serious nuclear threat to the United States.

This means the increasingly plausible threat of an unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war.

An additional conceptual distinction must now be inserted into any US analytic scenario mix. This is the subtle but still important difference between an inadvertent nuclear war and an accidental nuclear war. To wit, any accidental nuclear war would have to be inadvertent; conversely, however, there could be identifiable forms of inadvertent nuclear war that would not be accidental. Most critical in this connection are various more-or-less significant errors in calculation committed by one or both sides that is, reciprocal mistakes that could lead directly and inexorably to a nuclear conflict. Te most blatant example would concern assorted misjudgments of enemy intent or capacity that might somehow emerge during the course of any one particular crisis escalation.

Such dire misjudgments would likely stem from an expectedly mutual search for strategic advantage occurring during any particular competition in nuclear risk-taking. In expressly strategic parlance, this would suggest a substantially traditional military search for escalation dominance in extremis atomicum.[21]

Rationality versus Irrationality

There would also need to be various related judgments concerning expectations of rationality and irrationality within each affected countrys decision-making structure. One potential source of an unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war could be a failed strategy of pretended irrationality. A foolishly-posturing American president who had too successfully convinced enemy counterparts of his own irrationality could spark an otherwise-avoidable enemy preemption.

Played in the other direction, an American president who had begun to take seriously Kim Jung Uns own presumed unpredictability could sometime be frightened into striking first. In this alternate case, the United States would become the preempting party that might then claim legality for its allegedly defensive first-strike. In such inherently dicey circumstances, those US strategists charged with fashioning an optimal strategic posture would do well to recall Carl von Clausewitzs oft-quoted warning in On War concerning friction. In essence, this Clausewitzian property represents the difference between war on paper and war as it actually is.

Always, it represents an unerringly vital difference, one never determinable by what former US President Trump had naively called attitude.

Americas incoming president, unlike his unreasoning predecessor,[22] ought to be sufficiently well-grounded in science and logic. Though rarely acknowledged, however, no truly scientific or reliable probability estimations can ever be undertaken in regard to unprecedented situations. In science, authentic probability judgments must always be based upon the carefully calculated frequency of relevant past events.

Incontrovertibly, on matters regarding a nuclear war, there have been no such past events. By definition, such events would be unique or sui generis. The American bombings of Japan in August 1945 did not constitute a nuclear war. They were only examples of atomic weapons being used during a conventional war.

President Bidens strategic advisors must take heed. This sort of behind-the-news analytic assessment is not reasonably controversial. Not only there has there never been a nuclear war, there have also never been the sorts of asymmetrical nuclear standoffs most apt to arise between Washington and Pyongyang.

Because there can never be any informed scientific assessments of probable war outcomes in this volatile Asian theatre, US President Joe Biden should approach any pertinent war scenarios very soberly, with recognizable humility (the ancient Greek philosophers would be warning here against hubris) and with considerable war-reluctance.

Recalling the good old days, which extend well into the twentieth-century, nation-states have generally had to defeat enemy armies before being able to wreak wished-for destruction upon an adversarys cities and infrastructures. In those earlier days of more traditional doctrinal arrangements concerning war and peace, any individual countrys demonstrated capacity to win was necessarily and understandably prior to achieving any needed capacity to destroy. An appropriate and well-known example to US military thinkers at such venerable institutions as the US Army War College or West Point would be the case of Persia and Greece at the long-studied 480 BCE Battle of Thermopylae.

Today, unlike what seemingly took place at Thermopylae, a state enemy neednt first be able to defeat American armies in order to inflict grievous harms on the United States. As an example, such an enemy could enlist selectively destructive proxy forces on its behalf, such as various bio-terrorist surrogates. What happens then to the prevailing balance of power?

For President Biden and his counselors, there is still some prospectively good news. Accordingly, the United States neednt be able to win a particular conflict in order to credibly threaten a significant foe (deterrence) or to inflict upon such an enemy considerable retaliatory harms (punishment). What this good news means today is that the capacity to deter is not necessarily identical to the capacity to win.[23] Reciprocally, for the new American presidents defense counselors, the principal war-planning or war-deterring lesson of any such ongoing transformations warrants further study.

What will matter here is not personal attitude (previous President Donald Trumps self-described ace in the hole), but intellectual preparation.[24]What matters most, going forward, will be a capacity to win bewilderingly complex struggles of mind over mind, not just ad hoc or visceral contests of mind over matter.[25] In time, moreover, critical strategy lessons could apply beyond the specifically North Korean nuclear issue.

Points of Law

There are various relevant points of law to consider.[26] Jurisprudencehas its own proper place in strategic calculations. Specifically, in terms of applicable law, winning and losing may no longer mean very much for successful strategic planning. The consequential devaluation of victory and defeat as operational goals should be increasingly obvious with regard to Americas now seemingly-latent wars on terror. More precisely, pertinent conflict issues will need to be examined within continuously transforming US military plans and objectives regarding Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Russia, Yemen and assorted other places.

Prima facie, the U.S. can never meaningfully win any wars with Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, etc. This is because its leaders could never know for certain when a tangible victory had actually been achieved or loss incurred.

There is still more for the incoming American president to consider. Operationally, winning and losing are now fully extraneous to Americas indispensable collective interests, or, in those foreseeable cases where victory might still be expressed as a high-priority national objective, overwhelmingly harmful. In principle, and not without substantial irony, a narrowly static orientation to winning could sometime lead the United States toward huge and irreversible losses via critical American misjudgments regarding escalation dominance.Above all, under President Joe Biden, U.S. military posture should cease being shaped according to the starkly barren expectations of clamorous clichs, inexpert advice or irrelevant analogies.

This is not about rallies.

It must be about wise counsel.

Always.

Calculated US posture ought always be based upon the most expressly disciplined theses and antitheses of dialectical strategic thought, a proven pattern of analysis that goes back to Plato and his perpetually illustrative dialogues.

Finally, Americas new president and his military planners could look more usefully to the East. Long ago, famed Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu had reasoned simply and succinctly: Subjugating the enemys army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence. To meet current U.S. national security objectives vis--vis North Korea and other potential nuclear adversaries, this ancient Chinese military wisdom suggests that Washington now openly emphasize deterrence rather than victory. This is not a time to continue any buffoon-like presidential threats about the size of national buttons. President Trump, we may recall, once said of Kim Jung Un, He also has a button, but my button is bigger than his button.

This childlike assertion was hardly an enviable example of sophisticated strategic thought.

At the same time, any necessary discontinuance of strategic competition should remain connected to the most stringent requirements of conducting or maintaining control over plausible military escalations. If, going forward, these requirements were somehow minimized or disregarded, a resultant regional conflict could have decisive spillover implications for other nation-states and for other parts of the world. Once again, assorted elements of chaos notwithstanding,[27] world politics and world military processes are always expressive of an underlying system.

This characterization is clarifying and elucidating. It must lie continuously at the core of absolutely any coherent US strategic doctrine.

Forging US Strategic Doctrine

Before these systemic connections can be adequately understood and assessed, the new US president must realize that the complicated logic of strategic nuclear calculations demands a discrete and capably nuanced genre of decision-making, one that calls for rigorous intellectual refinement in extremis atomicum. As an example, casually expecting an American president to convincingly leverage Chinese and Russian sanctions on behalf of the United States could miss at least two vital and intersecting points: (1) the regime in Pyongyang will never back down on its overall plan for nuclearization, however severe such sanctions might seemingly become; and (2) counting upon meaningful sanctions from Beijing or Moscow will become inherently problematic for President Biden.

This is because both China and Russia remain more worried about their traditional national enemy in Washington than about any possible future dangers arising from Pyongyang.[28]

Remembering that North Korea is Already Nuclear

In world politics, as in law, truth is exculpatory. Like it or not, a nuclear North Korea is a fait accompli. Soon, President Biden should focus upon creating stable nuclear deterrence with North Korea (a) for the obvious benefit of the United States; (b) for the benefit of its directly vulnerable allies in South Korea and Japan; and (c) for the benefit of its indirectly vulnerable allies elsewhere, including Israel in the still-dissembling Middle East.[29]

However inconspicuous, these important allies remain an integral component of the same organic world system; they can never be helpfully separated from expectedly palpable consequences of an American geopolitical posture.

The existence of `system in the world is at once obvious to every observer of nature, says the 20th century French Jesuit scholar, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, no matter whom. Nowhere is this core interrelatedness more obvious or potentially consequential than in the continuing matter of a nuclear North Korea and US foreign policy decision-making. This consistently urgent threat will never subside or disappear on its own. It will be the new US presidents continuing role to understand all relevant American security obligations and their ensuing complications.

In accepting this grave responsibility, it would prove especially wise for the new US president to bear in mind the ancient Funeral Speech warning of Pericles. As recalled most famously by Thucydides: What I fear more than the strategies of our enemies, said the wise Athenian leader, are our own mistakes. Of course, in the best of all possible worlds, an American president could finally prepare to go beyond Realpoliitk and its endlessly belligerent nationalism[30] a perpetually futile dynamic that has never succeeded and is destined for continued failure but the world is not yet ready for any such transformation.[31]

If, however, that auspicious time should arrive sometime in the future, President Bidens key task will be to focus upon the essential interrelatedness or oneness[32] of all world politics. Just as each individual human being, the microcosm, is comprised of interlocking biological systems, world politics, the macrocosm, is made up of variously constituent national and sub-national systems. In both examples, microcosm and macrocosm, survival will require more reliable and generalized patterns of cooperation between systems.

Just wars, wrote Hugo Grotius, the acknowledged founder of modern international law, arise from our love of the innocent.[33] Now, however, it is plain, and again by definition, that a nuclear war could never be just, and that certain earlier legal distinctions (e.g., just war vs. unjust war) must be continuously conformed to the ever-changing technologies of military destruction. The only sensible adaptation in this regard must be to acknowledge persisting connections between international law and natural law, and then to oppose any retrograde movements to undermine such vital acknowledgments.

In the final analysis, to successfully prevent a nuclear war in Asia or anywhere else, it will be necessary to resist mightily any world system declensions toward further belligerent nationalism.

Plainly and incontestably, the best use for American nuclear weapons in any ongoing US-North Korea negotiation must be as elements of dissuasion or persuasion, and not as actual weapons of war. In this regard, the key underlying principle goes back even before the advent of nuclear weapons. Remembering the ancient Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu in his On War (Chapter 3, Planning Offensives): Subjugating the enemys army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.

A nuclear war with North Korea would resemble any other terminal pathology. The only reasonable hopes lie in disease prevention.

[1] Indirect vulnerabilities would be those derivative threats somehow made manifest in other countries or other country relations. Under certain imaginable circumstances, Americas indirect and/or direct vulnerabilities could become existential.

[2] The masses have followed the magicians again and againSocrates and Plato were the first to take up the struggle against them in clear awareness of what was at stake. (See: Karl Jaspers, Reason and Anti-Reason in our Time; 1952).

[3] This acceleration was due in part to US President Donald J. Trumps singular focus on personal public relations. In this regard, analysts and scholars may usefully consult not just their daily newspapers, but also Sophocles, Antigone, Speech of Creon, King of Thebes: I hold despicable and always have.anyone who puts his own popularity before his country.

[4] This principle was axiomatic among the ancient Greeks and Macedonians. See. F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (1957).

[5]Pertinent synergies could clarify or elucidate the world political systems current state of hyper-disorder (a view that would reflect what the physicists prefer to call entropic conditions), and could be conceptually dependent upon each national decision-makers subjective metaphysics of time. For an early article by this author dealing with interesting linkages between such a subjective chronology and national decision-making (linkages that could shed additional light on still-growing risks of a US-North Korea nuclear war), see: Louis Ren Beres, Time, Consciousness and Decision-Making in Theories of International Relations, The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. VIII, No.3., Fall 1974, pp. 175-186.

[6] We fell in love, said US President Donald J. Trump at his Singapore summit in June 2018.

[7]The Trump White House consistently sought to persuade Americans by way of very deliberate simplifications and falsifications. See, on the plausible consequences of any such deceptive measures, Ludwig Wittgensteins core observation in On Certainty: Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry.

[8] See, by this author, Louis Ren Beres, at Harvard National Security Journal, Harvard Law School: https://harvardnsj.org/2015/06/core-synergies-in-israels-strategic-planning-when-the-adversarial-whole-is-greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts/ See also, by Professor Beres, at Modern War Institute, West Point: https://mwi.usma.edu/threat-convergence-adversarial-whole-greater-sum-parts/

[9] For early accounts by this author of certain potentially synergistic nuclear war effects, see: Louis Ren Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Louis Ren Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: Americas Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983); Louis Ren Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1984); and Louis Ren Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israels Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986). Most recently, by Professor Beres, see: Surviving Amid Chaos: Israels Nuclear Strategy (New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed. 2018). https://paw.princeton.edu/new-books/surviving-amid-chaos-israel%E2%80%99s-nuclear-strategy

[10] Drawn from aptly famous statement of Athenians to the Melians (a colony of Sparta) from The Debate on the Fate of Melos (416 BCE).

[11] Elements of such essential doctrine could sometimes be counter-intuitive. For example, from the standpoint of stable nuclear deterrence, the likelihood of any actual nuclear conflict between states (inter alia) could be inversely related to the plausibly expected magnitude of catastrophic harms. Nonetheless, this is only an informal presumption because we are here considering a unique or unprecedented event, one that is sui generis for purposes of determining any true mathematical probabilities.

[12] In the words of French Jesuit philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardins The Phenomenon of Man (1955): The existence of `system in the world is at once obvious to every observer of nature, no matter whom

[13] In his seminal writings, strategic theorist Herman Kahn introduced a further distinction between a surprise attack that is more-or-less unexpected, and a surprise attack that arrives entirely out of the blue. The former, he counseled, is likely to take place during a period of tension that is not so intense that the offender is essentially prepared for nuclear war. A total surprise attack, however, would be one without any immediately recognizable tension or warning signal. This particular subset of a surprise attack scenario could be difficult to operationalize for tangible national security policy benefit. See: Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (Simon & Schuster, 1984).

[14] See by this author, at one of his earliest books: Louis Ren Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (The University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[15] Under authoritative international law, which is generally part of US law, the question of whether or not a state of war exists between states is now ordinarily ambiguous. Traditionally, it was held that a formal declaration of war was necessary before any true state of war could be said to exist. Hugo Grotius divided wars into declared wars, which were legal, and undeclared wars, which were not. (See Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Bk. III, Chs. III, IV, and XI.) By the start of the twentieth century, the position that war can obtain only after a conclusive declaration of war by one of the parties was codified by Hague Convention III. This treaty stipulated, inter alia, that hostilities must never commence without a previous and explicit warning in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum. (See Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 1907, 3 NRGT, 3 series, 437, article 1.) Currently, formal declarations of war could be tantamount to admissions of international criminality because of the express criminalization of aggression by authoritative international law. It could, therefore, represent a clear jurisprudential absurdity to tie any true state of war to prior declarations of belligerency. It follows, further, that a state of war may exist without any formal declarations, but only if there should exist an actual armed conflict between two or more states, and/or at least one of these affected states considers itself at war.

[16] In law, such a defensive first-strike, if permissible, would be termed anticipatory self-defense. The precise origins of such defense liein customary international law, in The Caroline, a case that concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. Following this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally justified certain militarily defensive actions. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an antecedent attack. Here, the jurisprudential framework permitted a military response to a threat so long as the danger posed was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. See: Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187, 190-91 (1984)(noting that the Caroline case had transformed the right of self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine). Still earlier, see: Hugo Grotius, Of the Causes of War, and First of Self-Defense, and Defense of Our Property, reprinted in 2 Classics of International Law, 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925)(1625); and Emmerich de Vattel, The Right of Self-Protection and the Effects of the Sovereignty and Independence of Nations, reprinted in 3 Classics of International Law, 130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916)(1758). Also, Samuel Pufendorf, The Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, 32 (Frank Gardner Moore., tr., 1927 (1682).

[17] In a dark time, says the Poet Theodore Roethke, the eye begins to see.

[18] From the standpoint of international law, it is necessary to distinguish preemptive attacks from preventive ones. Preemption is a military strategy of striking first in the expectation that the only foreseeable alternative is to be struck first oneself. A preemptive attack is launched by a state that believes enemy forces are about to attack. A preventive attack is launched not out of any genuine concern about imminent hostilities, but rather for fear of a longer-term deterioration in a pertinent military balance. In a preemptive attack, the length of time by which the enemys action is anticipated is presumptively very short; in a preventive strike, the anticipated interval is considerably longer. A related problem here for the United States is not only the practical difficulty of accurately determining imminence, but also that delaying a defensive strike until appropriately ascertained urgencies can be acknowledged could itself prove fatal (existential).

[19] Customary international law, which must be the jurisprudential justification for any permissible defensive first strike or preemption, is an authoritative source of world legal norms identified at Art. 38 of the UNs Statute of the International Court of Justice. International law, an integral part of the legal system of all states in world politics, assumes a general obligation to supply benefits to one another, and to avoid war wherever possible. This core assumption of jurisprudential solidarity is known formally as a peremptory or jus cogens expectation, that is, one that is not subject to any reasonable question. It can be found, inter alia, in Justinian, Corpus Juris Civilis, Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (1625) and Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law (1758).

[20] See Poppers classic, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).

[21] In assessing the risks and benefits of such a search, analysts would have to pay close attention to the specific scenarios of a limited nuclear war.

[22] During his dissembling presidency, too little attention had been directed toward Donald J. Trumps open loathing of science and intellect, and to his corresponding unwillingness to read, anything. Ironically, the Founding Fathers of the United States were intellectuals. As explained by American historian Richard Hofstadter: The Founding Fathers were sages, scientists, men of broad cultivation, many of them apt in classical learning, who used their wide reading in history, politics and law to solve the exigent problems of their time. See Hofstadters Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 145. A conclusion ought to surface: How far we Americans have fallen.

[23] This capacity is contingent upon the expected rationality of the adversarial state. Irrational adversaries would likely; not be suitably deterred by the same threats directed at presumptively rational foes. On pertinent errors of correct deterrence reasoning (here regarding Iran in particular) see: Louis Ren Beres and General John T. Chain, Could Israel Safely Deter a Nuclear Iran? The Atlantic, August 2012; and Professor Louis Ren Beres and General John T. Chain, Israel and Iran at the Eleventh Hour, Oxford University Press (OUP Blog). February 23, 2012. General Chain (USAF/ret.) served as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC).

[24] When meeting in Singapore with Kim Jung Un on June 11, 2018, Trump dismissed all usual presidential leadership obligations to study and prepare. Instead, he emphasized, again and again, offhandedly: I dont think I have to prepare very much. Its all about attitude.[24]

[25] The seventeenth-century French philosopher Blaise Pascal remarks prophetically in Penses: All our dignity consists in thought.It is upon this that we must dependLet us labor then to think well: this is the foundation of morality. Similar reasoning characterizes the writings of Baruch Spinoza, Pascals 17th-century contemporary. In Book II of his Ethics Spinoza considers the human mind, or the intellectual attributes, and drawing further upon Ren Descartes strives to define an essential theory of learning and knowledge.

[26] For the United States, international law remains a part of this nations core domestic law. In the words used by the U.S. Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana, International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1900). See also: The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(per curiam)(Edwards, J. concurring)(dismissing the action, but making several references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)(concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant international standardsembodied in the principle of `universal violations of international law.')

[27] Whether it is described in the Old Testament or any other major sources of ancient Western thought, chaos can be viewed as something positive, even as a source of human betterment. Here, chaos is taken as that which prepares the world for all things, both sacred and profane. As its conspicuous etymology reveals, chaos further represents the yawning gulf or gap wherein nothing is as yet, but where all civilizational opportunity must inevitably originate. Appropriately, the classical German poet Friedrich Hlderlin observed: There is a desert sacred and chaotic which stands at the roots of the things and which prepares all things. Even in the pagan ancient world, the Greeks thought of such a desert as logos, which should indicate to us today that it was never presumed to be starkly random or without evident merit.

[28] Postulating the emergence of Cold War II means expecting the world system to become once again bipolar. For early writings, by this author, on the global security implications of such an expanding bipolarity, see: Louis Ren Beres, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments, Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 25, No.4., December 1972, pp. 702-710; Louis Ren Beres, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Tragedy of the Commons, Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.4., December 1973, pp, 649-658; and Louis Ren Beres, Guerillas, Terrorists, and Polarity: New Structural Models of World Politics, Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.4., December 1974, pp. 624-636.

[29] Though US good offices under Trump played a decisive role in creating new Israeli ties to UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, these ties will do little to alleviate the most fundamental and underlying strains of discord in the region. See also latest book by this author, Louis Ren Beres, Surviving Amid Chaos: Israels Nuclear Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed., 2018). http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/surviving-amid-chaos-israels-nuclear-strategy

[30] International law remains a vigilante or Westphalian system. See: Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct. 1648, 1., Consol. T.S. 119, Together, these two treaties comprise the Peace of Westphalia. Nonetheless, in international law, there are always certain core obligations that each state owes to other nations. See, accordingly, by Louis Ren Beres: https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/jurist-us-abandons-legal-obligations-syria; and

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Peaceful transition of power is the American dream right now - Modern Diplomacy

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